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The purpose of this paper is to prove the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics and the existence of competitive equilibrium in production economies over
an in¯nite horizon with general consumption sets. In the literature the second funda-
mental theorem of welfareeconomics has been only approximately proved with uniform
properness assumption on preferences. In order to generalize the theorem for a model
that allows general comsumption set, the uniform properness assumption should be
reduced. We prove the theorem in the exact form not assuming the assumption. The
irreducibility of an economy and a joint assumption on consumers' preferences and
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1production that makes the sustainable growth of the economy possible play the key
role.
1 Introduction
Theexistence ofcompetitive equilibrium within¯nitedimensional commodity space has been
studied since seminal papers Bewley(1972) and Peleg{Yaari(1970). On the other hand, the
second fumdamental theorem of welfare economics in in¯nite dimensional commodity spaces
was proved by Debreu(1954) when the production set has non-empty interior by applying
the separation theorem as the same way as the one in ¯nite dimensional cases. In in¯nite
dimensional commodity spaces the supporting price of Pareto optimal allocations cannot
be found by this approach. In order to overcome this di±culty the uniform properness
assumption is introduced by Mas-Collel(1986), and there are extensive researches on the
equilibrium existence problem along this line.
However there are many economically important commodity spaces where it is inap-
propriate to assume the uniform properness. Among those spaces here we focus on linear
subspaces of sn, the set of sequences of ¯nite dimensional vectors, which we use as the
commodity spaces. They are the class of commodity spaces for economies over an in¯nite
horizon. It is inappropriate to assume the uniform properness in this setting, since it is
inconsistent with myopia of preferences. For example there is no utility function on s, the
set of real sequence, which are strictly monotonic, quasi-concave, product continuous, and
at the same time uniformly product proper.1 It is well known that the product continuity
of preference in s expresses the myopia of preferences.
Economies over an in¯nite horizon have been studied by Peleg{Yaari(1970) and Boyd{
McKenzie (1993). They establishedthe equilibrium existence theoremwithcommodity space
sn. Evaluation of the feasible commodity allocations with vectors in sn which is not the dual
of the commodity space is very important for their results. We follow this approach with
the broader class of commodity spaces including theirs.
One contribution of this paper is to make clear a su±cient condition for the second
fundamental theorem of welfare economics in this setting. In the literature it is shown that a
weakly Pareto optimal allocation may fail to be supported by some non-zerolinear functional
1See, Aliprantis{Brown{Birkinshaw(1989, Example 3.6.9. p. 174).
2in the dual of commodity space. Without uniform properness only "¡approximate support
theorems has been established by Aliplantis-Burkinshaw (1988) and Becker-Bercovici-Foias
(1992). With commodity price duality Khan -Vohra(1985), Aliplantis -Burkinshaw(1988)
proved "¡ approximate support property of weak Pareto optimum. The second fundamental
theorem of welfare economics in this paper is not "¡approximate version. The su±cient
condition has its origin in Boyd-McKenzie(1993). However the supportability is shown only
at the Edgeworth equilibrium in their paper, since they use the Edgeworth approach to
prove the existence theorem. Also the regularity assumption in this paper is weaker than
the assumption in Boyd-McKenzie(1993).They impose the regularity assumption to possible
net trade set with the technology of each consumer. On the other hand we impose this
assumption only to aggregate possible net trade of entire consumers with the technology. By
virtue ofintroducingnew price normalizationdi®erent from the one of Boyd-McKenzie(1993)
we can weaken the regularity assumption.
Our regularity assumption is joint condition on preferences, endowments among agents
and a production set. The regularity assumption can be interpreted as follows; consumers
are su±ciently myopic and the technology is productive in the future so that slight increase
of social net trade at the ¯rst period cause some constant net supply in the future far enough
and consumers are still well o®.
Another contribution of this paper is to show that even with general consumption sets;
they do not have to contain their lower bounds, if the regularity assumption is satis¯ed ir-
reducibility is su±cient for the equilibrium existence theorem. Burke(1988) shows a counter
example to the equilibrium existence theorem in an economy over an in¯nite horizon with
general consumption sets. Boyd-McKenzie (1993) proves the equilibrium existence theorem
with general consumption sets. It, however, must pay a cost of a strong version of irre-
ducibility to assure the equal treatment property in the core allocation. This is crucial for
the non-emptiness of the equal treatment core, and so the existence of Edgeworth equi-
librium. It says that for any non-trivial partition of consumers, one group of consumers
can always spread their gains, if exist, to consumers in the other group, and the resulting
allocation is still feasible.2 This assumption holds when preferences are monotonic and con-
2Although they use net trading sets to de¯ne strongly irreducibility, it can be de¯ned in terms of con-
3sumption sets are the positive orthant. This is, however, strong in the sense that it assume
directly the existence of a special feasible allocation.
We replace strong irreducibility with usual irreducibility and establish the existence of
a competitive equilibrium in production economies with general consumption sets over an
in¯nite horizon by Negishi approach appealing tothel1-price supportability ofPareto optimal
allocations with the regularity assumption.
The procedure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we set up our economy and
explain our assumptions. We establish the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics
in section 3 and the existence of competitive equilibrium is proved in section 4. Section 5
contains concluding remarks.
2 Economy
We aregoing toconsidera discrete time openended economy. Commodities are distinguished
with their physical properties, their location and the dates on delivery. At each date there
is same variation of di®erent commodities. They are indexed with k = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢n. Thus our
commodity space is a subspace of sn = Rn £ Rn £ ¢ ¢ ¢. The mathematical description of
our commodity space is as follows:
Commodity space E is a subspace of sn such that there is W ½ ba where (E;W) is a Riesz
symmetric dual system and E inherited a natural order from sn:
There are three important examples of Riesz symmetric dual system which appears in
economic literature.
i) ( sn;coo) ii) (l1;l1) iii) (l1(¯);l1(1=¯))
De¯ne kxk1 = supfjxk (t)j : t = 0;1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;k = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;ng. Then l1 = fx 2 sn : kxk1





jpk (t)j. Then l1 = fp 2 sn : kpk1 < 1g: Also de¯ne kxk1(¯) = supfjxk(t)j=¯t





jpk (t)j: Then l1(¯) = fx
2 sn : kxk1(¯) < 1g and l1(1=¯) = fp 2 sn : kpk1(1=¯) < 1g:
sumption sets as well.
4Mathematically important property of Riesz symmetric dual system (E;E0) is that every
order interval of E is weakly compact and if (E;E0) is a Riesz symmetric dual system,
(E0;E) is likewisea Riesz symmetric dual system. Therefore the weak topology ¾(E;E0) can
be considered as weak star topology for dual system (E0;E): This property is convenient to
apply Alaoglu's theorem.
Economically l1 is the space which does not allow growing economy and this is a special
case of L1 which is used in Bewley (1972). sn and l1(¯) may allow growing path of the
economy. sn is used in Peleg{Yaari (1970) and Boyd{Mckenzie (1993). l1(¯) is isomorphic
to l1 and can be thought of as having the discount factor 1=¯ built in. This space is used
by Boyd(1990).
Our description of commodity space E includes all of these cases, thus it is easy to
compare the results with others.
There are ¯nite number of consumers indexed with i = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;H who have a con-
sumption set Ci ½ E and a preference P i which express strict preference over Ci. We can
interpret these consumers in two ways: as in¯nitely lived agents with open ended economy
or as ¯nitely lived agents who does not know own terminal date of life and has preference
over in¯nite horizon consumption set.
The market is complete and opens for all commodities at ¯rst date. It is possible to
consider agents have perfect foresight in the future or there is a market for contingent claim
plan over in¯nite horizon economy.
Theproductionsector is representedwithaconvex cone technology over E: Withconstant
returns to scale technology we assume perfect competition among producers and there is free
entry and exit. Thus the number of producers cannot be set a priori.
Our price space for the market is represented with sn. This price space is ¯rst used
by Peleg{Yaari(1970) in exchange economies and later extended into production economies
by Boyd{McKenzie (1993). In in¯nite horizon economy the commodity price duality is
often used to represent price system. It evaluates each commodity bundle, but does not
necessarily evaluate each commodity itself. In contrast our price system does not necessarily
evaluate every commodity bundle, but does evaluate each goods in a commodity bundle
in a coodinatewise fashion. These two price space are the same one in ¯nite dimensional
5commodity space. This is a speci¯c issue to in¯nite dimensional commodity spaces.
Now we are ready to state and discuss our assumptions on economy. Before to do so, let
us de¯ne some notations for convenience.
a) We denote x 2 sn; x(t) 2 Rn at time period t, and
x = (x(0);x(1);¢ ¢ ¢)
b) Let x;y 2 sn: We denote x ¸ y if xk (t) ¸ yk(t) for all t = 0;1;¢ ¢ ¢;k = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;n.
As the same way x > y if x ¸ y and xk (t) > yk(t) for some t;k:
c) Let e = (1;¢ ¢ ¢;1); an unit vector in Rn, then we use
e(0) = (e;0;0;¢ ¢ ¢) and e(t) = (0;¢ ¢ ¢;e;0;¢ ¢ ¢):
d) x
+
k (t) = maxf0;xk(t)g; x(t)
+ = (x1(t);¢ ¢ ¢;xn(t)):
x
¡
k (t) = minf0;xk(t)g; x(t)
¡ = (x1(t);¢ ¢ ¢;xn(t)):
{ Assumptions {
(1) For each consumer i, the consumption set Ci is convex and ¾ (E;W)-closed. The net
trading set Ci ¡ f!ig is bounded below by b 2 l1for each i:
(2) For each consumer i; the strongly preferred correspondence Pi is convex and ¾(E;W)-
open valued, and has ¾(E;W)-open lower sections relatively in Ci. The preference
relation de¯ned from Pi is irre°exive and transitive. The weakly preferred set Ri (x)
is the ¾ (E;W)-closure of Pi(x) for all x 2 Ci unless Pi(x) = ;:
(3) Let x 2 Ci: If z ¸ x; then z 2 Ri(x). (weak monotonicity)
(4) The production set Y is a ¾(E;W)-closed convex cone with vertex at the origin and
contains no straight line.
(5) De¯ne Fi(xi) = R(xi) ¡ f!ig for xi 2 Ci. Then for any v 2
P
i
Fi(xi) ¡ Y the following
holds.
For any ²: > 0, there exists ¿0 and ® > 0 2 Rn such that ¿ > ¿0 implies
(v(0) + ² e(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢) 2
P
i
Fi(xi) ¡ Y: (regularity assumption)
(6) For all z 2 E; the set fy 2 Y : y ¸ zg is order bounded.
6(7) For all i, there is xi 2 Ci and yi 2 Y such that (xi ¡ !i) < yi and
P
i
(yi¡(xi¡!i)) = (°;°;¢¢¢) for some °(2 Rn) À 0. (aggregate adequacy assumption)
(8) The economy is irreducible: whenever I1 and I2 is a nontrivial partition of f1;¢ ¢ ¢;Hg
and
P
i2I(xi ¡ !i) 2 Y with xi 2 Ci for all i 2 I, there are
P
i2I1(zi ¡ !i) +
P
i2I2 ®i(zi ¡ !i) 2 Y with ziPixi for i 2 I1 and,
zi 2 Ci and some ®i > 0 for i 2 I2. (irreducibility assumption)
It follows that net supply of consumer such as labor is bounded from above by an element
of l1 from assumption (1). It does not mean that a consumption bundle x 2 Ci or !i is in
l1:
In assumption (1) and (2), we induce the topology ¾ (E;W) on the consumption sets. It
depends on whether the use of it is economically natural or not. The examples described
before we can interpret the continuity of preferencewith respect to¾ (E;W) as myopia. Note
that ¾(sn;coo) is product topology and it is well known that the continuity of preferences
with respect to the product topology expresses strong myopia of preference. The weak(¤)
¾(l1;l1) topology has same closed convex sets as the Mackey ¿ (l1;l1) topology has. The
Mackey topology is used in Bewley (1972) and it is shown that continuity os preference with
respect to the Mackey topology can be interpreted as myopia in the paper. Since l1(¯) is
homeomorphic to l1 and l1(1=¯) is homeomorphic to l1, the same interpretation may be
possible.
The other assumptions in assumption (1) and (2) are standard in general equilibrium
theory. Especially we need assumption (2) for the existence of utility representation. Tran-
sitivity plays key role in it. Note that our consumption set Ci is general in the sense it does
not necessarily include its lower bound. Thus it allows us for substitution between goods on
the boundary and we can consider labor in our commodity space.
Weak monotonicity of preferences is assumed in assumption (3). The weak monotonicity
is standard and strong monotonicity in the ¯rst period can be interpreted as a result of
myopia.
As described before our technology exhibit constant returns to scale. The irreversibility
of production process is also assumed in assumption (4). As Boyd{McKenzie (1993) showed
7this formulation include Malinvaud technology with constant returns to scale.
Assumption (5) is important condition for our result. Consider an aggregate net supply
with consumptions weakly preferred to an original consumption. Then any slight increase of
aggregate net supply in the ¯rst period can produce constant positive aggregate net supply
permanently in the future after some period without any change in net supply of other
periods and every possible consumptions generated from the new aggregate net supply is
still weakly preferred to the original consumption. This is a joint condition on preferences
and endowments among consumers and production set. In section 5 we discuss on this
condition again.
Assumption (6) is equivalent to that for all time period and goods if net output is larger
than some real number "(t;k) > 0, there exist ±(t;k) > 0 such that net input is larger than
±(t;k) for all t;k. As the same way if net input is smaller than some real number "(t;k) >
0 there exists ±(t;k) > 0 such that net output is smaller than ±(t;k) for each t;k.
Adequacy assumption is same as the one used by Boyd{McKenzie(1993). With this
condition, we can show that the aggregate income of the economy is positive. This, however,
does not imply that each consumer's income is positive. Only some consumers have positive
incomes. Bewley(1972) uses the stronger individual adequacy assumption which is stated
as (yi ¡ (xi ¡ !i)) = (¡°i;¡°i;¢ ¢ ¢) for some °i(2 Rn) holds for each i. This individual
adequacy assumption trivially implies the aggregate and conclude that every consumer in
the economy has a positive income.
The irreducibility assumption (8) is usual one andis not the strong irreducibility assump-
tionusedby Boyd{McKenzie(1993). We need this condition tospread the positiveincomes of
some consumers due to the aggregate adequacy assumption (7) over every consumer, which
is necessary in translatating a quasi-equilibrium into a competitive equilibrium. The strong
irreducibility of Boyd{McKenzie(1993) is used to establish the non-emptiness of the equal
treatment core in their economies with general consumption sets in their Edgeworth equilib-
rium approach. Since we employ in stead the Negishi approach instead, we do not need this
strong irreducibility. The usual irreducibility assumption is enough for our purpose. This is
believed to be a contribution of this paper.
83 The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Eco-
nomics
In this section we prove the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. In the most
of literature this theorem is equivalent to the existence of supporting hyperplanes for the
weakly preferred sets of consumers and the production set at every Pareto optimal allocation.
The supporting vectors are in the dual of commodity space and determine the value of each
allocation. Appealing to the separation theorem based on this duality is powerful for the
proof of the theorem if the positive orthant of commodity space has nonempty interior. On
the other hand, however, the same argument does not apply to the commodity spaces with
empty interior. When we consider economies with ¯nite dimensional commodity spaces the
separation theorem can directly apply to prove the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, since any two convex subsets in ¯nite dimensional commodity spaces which have
disjoint interior can be separated at any point which is not interior to either sets. On the
other hand in in¯nite dimensional spaces we need to be more careful; the separation theorem
requires the existence points which is interior to one of the two sets. As Mas-Collel (1986)
shows a weakly preferred set of a consumption bundle in in¯nite dimensional commodity
space may fail to have interior points. The uniform properness assures that there exist
interior points we actually need.
The class of economies considered in this paper allows the commodity spaces which have
no interior points. To determine the values of allocations in commodity spaces, usually the
dual space of commodity space and valuation based on the duality are used. Here instead
coodinatewise valuation of allocations in Peleg{Yaari(1970) and Boyd{McKenzie(1993) is
adapted. In this situation, the support property of Pareto optimal allocations is considered
to hold if there is a way of social valuation of allocations satisfying the following; for each
consumer if a consumption allocation is not less preferred to the consumption of Pareto
optimal allocation, the valuation is also not less than that of the consumption at the Pareto
optimal allocation, and any production cannot yield positive pro¯ts and the production at
the Pareto optimal allocation has zero pro¯t with the valuation.
We have two versions of secondtheorem of welfare economics respectively with net trades
9(Theorem 3{1) and with consumptions (Corollary 3{1). It is usual to use consumptions to
state the theorem, because it should hold independently on distribution of endowments
among agents. In ¯nite dimensional commodity space or more generally in the commodity
space withprice systems as the dual of it, these twoversions ofsecond theorems are necessary
and su±cient for each other. On the other hand we have our price space as sn which is not
necessarily the dual of commodity space E, these are not equivalent. With the de¯nition
of a competitive equilibrium in section 4, the version with net trade is suitable for the
interpretation such that any Pareto optimal allocation can be realized as a competitive
equilibrium by redistributing endowments properly among consumers.
The valuations of net trade and production are as follows;
Valuation of net trade
1 P
t=0
p(t)(xi(t)¡ !i(t)) where xi 2 Ci; p 2 sn:
Valuation of production limsup¿
¿ P
t=0
p(t)y(t) where y 2 Y; p 2 sn:
It will be shown later in the proof of the theorems that the valuation of net trade has
only ¯nite value or +1 from assumption (1).
Now we de¯ne a weakly Pareto optimal allocation and Pareto optimal allocation.




!i) = y holds for some y 2 Y: An allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y) is weakly Pareto optimal,
whenever there exists no other allocation (x0
1;¢ ¢ ¢;x0
H;y0) satisfying x0
i 2 Pi(xi) for




i 2 Ri(xi) for all i; and there is some j such
that x0
j 2 Pj(xj). Obviously a Pareto optimal allocation is weakly Pareto optimal.
In the procedure of our proof we ¯rst show that there exists a separating hyperplane
between the origin 0 and (
P
i
Fi ¡ Y ) \ l1 where Fi = F i(xi) for a weakly Pareto optimal
allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y) with supporting vector in ¼ 2 ba: After that we decompose ¼ by
Yosida{Hewitt theorem and the l1 part of it is the candidate of asupporting price ofa weakly
Pareto optimal allocation. This method is originally developed by Boyd{McKenzie (1993)
and they use the idea to prove the supporting property of Edgeworth equilibrium.




¡ Y . The crucial fact for this result is the following Choquet's(1962) theorem. This theorem
is used by Boyd{McKenzie(1993) in the case of sN and by Ali Khan and Vohra(1988) in
general locally convex spaces.
Theorem[Choquet(1962)] : If Z ½ E is convex, ¾(E;W)-closed, and contains no straight
lines, then for any two convex and ¾(E;W)-closed subsets X and Y in Z, X + Y is
¾(E;W)-closed.3
Lemma 3{1 : For any (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH) 2 C1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢ £ CH ,
P
i
F i ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed:
Proof) By assumption (1) for all i Ci ¡ f!ig is bounded from below by b 2 l1: This
implies Fi(xi) is bounded below by b for all i: Thus Fi(xi) ¡ Y ½ b + E+ ¡ Y. We want to
show b + E+ ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed, convex and contains no straight line. Since any ¯nite
sum of convex sets is convex, b + E+ ¡ Y is convex from assumption (4).
Note that if E+ ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed then b + E+ ¡ Y is also ¾(E;W)-closed, since
any net in b + E+ ¡ Y has the form fb + z®g where fz®g is a net in E+ ¡ Y . Moreover if
E+ ¡Y contains no straight line b + E+ ¡ Y is also contains no straight line since E+ ¡ Y
is convex and b is a single point.
We claim
E+ ¡ Y is ¾ (E;W)-closed and contains no straight line.
Suppose E+ ¡ Y has elements z; ¡z. Then there are y; y0 2 Y such that z ¸ ¡y and ¡z ¸
¡y0: This implies y + y0 ¸ 0. Since Y is a cone, for any ¸ ¸ 0;¸(y + y0) 2 Y: However by
assumption (6), fy 2 Y : y ¸ 0g has an upper bound. Therefore y + y0 should be 0, and y
= ¡y0: From assumption (5), Y contains no straight line. Thus y = ¡y0 = 0: It implies z =
0 and E+ ¡ Y contains no straight line.
Next we claim that E+ ¡ Y is ¾ (E;W)-closed. Let fz®g be a net which z® 2 E+ ¡ Y
and z® ! z in ¾(E;W) as ® ". Fix some order interval such as z 2 [a;c]: Then there is
a converging subnet fz®(k)g such that z®(k) 2 [a;c] and z®(k) ! z as k " since (E;W) is
3This is a specialization of a theorem in Choquet(1962). The original statement of this theorem uses
the ¾(E;W )-completeness of Z. Since (E;W) is Riesz sysmetric dual, indeed, we can replace it with its
¾(E;W )-closedness.
11a Riesz symmetric dual system and hence [a;c] is ¾(E;W)-compact. Note that there are
v®(k) 2 E+; and y®(k) 2 Y satisfying z®(k) = v®(k) ¡ y®(k): This implies that c ¸ z®(k) ¸
¡y®(k), so y®(k) ¸ ¡c. Thus fy®(k)g has uniform lower bound. From assumption (6), fy®(k)g
has uniform upper bound. Thus fy®(k)g is in a compact set, and so has limit y 2 Y: Since
¾(E;W) is a Hausdor® topology, the limit of fz®(k)g equals to z: Note z®(k) = v®(k) ¡ y®(k)
and z®(k) ¸ ¡y®(k) implies that z ¸ ¡y and v = z + y ¸ 0 2 E+: Thus z 2 E+ ¡ Y , and
so E+ ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed. Thus, (1 { 1) holds.
Now we can apply Choquet's theorem and
P
iFi ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed.
Lemma 3{2 : For any weakly Pareto optimal allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y) there exist ¼ 2 ba
such that
¼ ¢ v ¸ 0 holds for all v 2 (
P
i
F i(xi) ¡ Y) \ l1;¼ ¢ v ¸ 0 and,
¼ ¸ 0, ¼ 6= 0, and k¼kba = 1.
Proof) Let Fi = Fi(xi) for a weakly Pareto optimal allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y): We claim




F i ¡ Y:
Suppose not, then there exists x0









i ¡ !i + "=H ¢ e(0)) ¡y0 = 0. From monotonicity assumption x0
i + "=H ¢ e(0)








Fi ¡ Y is ¾(E;W)-closed. Also f¡"e(0)g is trivially ¾(E;W)-
compact. Now we can apply the separation theorem(Scheafer(1966) p.65), and there exists
f 2 W such that f ¢ v > f ¢(¡"e(0)) for any v 2
P
i
Fi ¡ Y. From monotonicity assumption
and the separation theorem, f ¸ 0; f 6= 0. Let u = (e;e;¢ ¢ ¢), a unit vector, and ¼ =
f=kfkba. (Recall that W ½ ba, so f 2 ba.) Then ¼¢v > ¡"¼ (0)¢e(0) and since ¼ ¸ 0, ¼ ¢u
¸ ¼(0) ¢ e(0) holds. Thus ¼ ¢ v > ¡"¼ ¢ u. Clearly ¼ ¢ u = k¼kba = 1 by de¯nition of the
norm. Consequently ¼ ¢ v > ¡" for any v 2
P
i
Fi ¡ Y. De¯ne S and S (") as follows.
S(") = f¼ 2 ba : k¼kba = 1, ¼ ¢ v ¸ ¡" for all v 2 (
P
i
Fi ¡ Y ) \ l1g:
S = f¼ 2 ba : k¼kba · 1, ¼ ¢ v ¸ ¡1 for all v 2 (
P
i
Fi ¡ Y) \l1:
12Clearly for any " > 0, S(") is non-empty and S(") forms a nested set sequences, and for
any " · 1 S(") ½ S(1) ½ S. Note S(") is a subset of the unit sphere of ba-norm equals to
1 and S is the subset of unit ball of ba-norm equals to1 and the fact that the evaluation
function is continuous with respect to ¾(ba;l1) and inequality is weak. Since the closed
unit ball in ba with respect to(ba;l1) is compact by Alaoglu's theorem, S is compact. The
non-emptiness of S(") allow us to pick up ¼" 2 S(") for all (0 <)" · 1. Let [0;1] be a
directed set with direction " ¹ "0 if and only if " ¸ "0. Then f¼"g forms a net in S. From
the compactness of S; there exists a converging subnet f¼"(¸)g in S such that ¼"(¸) ! ¼ in







ba = ¼"(¸)¢u and the evaluation function
is ¾(ba;l1) continuous. Thus ¼"(¸)¢ u ! ¼¢ u: Consequently ¼¢u = k¼kba = 1: Also for any
± > 0 there exists "o 2 [0;1] such that "o ¹ "(¸) implies
¯
¯
¯¼"(¸) ¢ v ¡ ¼ ¢ v
¯
¯
¯ < ±. Suppose




¯¼"(¸) ¢ v ¡ ¼ ¢ v
¯
¯
¯ > ±. Thus ¼ ¢ v ¸ 0.
Now we have a candidate for the supporting price of a weakly Pareto optimal allocation.
We are going to extend the supportability not only in l1 but over whole space.
Theorem 3{1 : For every weakly Pareto optimal allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y), there exists a





i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸
1 P
t=0





¼c(t) ¢ y(t) ¸ limsup¿!1
¿ P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ y0(t) for all y0 2 Y and
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ y(t) = 0,
(3) ¼c ¸ 0, ¼c 6= 0.
Proof) First notice that by assumption (5)(the regularity assumption) and assumption
(3), we know whenever v 2
P
i
F i(xi) ¡ Y for any " > 0, there exists ¿ such that ¿ > ¿
implies
(v(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);0;0;¢ ¢ ¢) +"e(0) 2
X
i
F i(xi) ¡ Y: (1)
13For any x0
i 2 Ri(xi), x0
i ¡ xi = x0
i ¡ !i +
P
j6=i
(xj ¡ !j) ¡ y holds since the feasibility of
the weakly Pareto optimal allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y) implies 0 =
P
i






Therefore from (1) we have (x0
i(0) ¡ xi(0);¢ ¢ ¢;x0




¡ Y . Then from lemma 3{1, there is ¼ 2 ba such that
¼¢ (x0
i(0)¡ xi(0);¢ ¢ ¢;x0
i(¿) ¡ xi(¿);0;0;¢ ¢ ¢)+ ¼ ¢ "e(0) ¸ 0: (2)
Notethat (x0
i(0) ¡ xi(0);¢ ¢ ¢;x0
i(¿) ¡ xi(¿);0;0;¢ ¢ ¢) + "e(0) has only ¯nitenonzero elements
and so it is in l1: From the Yosida{Hewitt theorem for this ¼(¸ 0) there is ¼c 2 l
+
1 such
that ¼ = ¼c + ¼f where ¼f(¸ 0) is the purely ¯nitely additive part. Since ¼f has zero values
over c00 and (x0
i(0) ¡ xi(0);¢ ¢ ¢;x0





i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸
¿ X
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (xi(t) ¡ !i(t))¡ "¼c(0)¢ e(0) (3)





¼c(t) ¢z(t) exists and ¼c ¢ z =
1 X
t=0
¼c(t)¢ z(t) is a ¯nite value or +1. (4)
De¯ne z¡ for z(2 s) by z¡ = 0 when z ¸ 0 and z¡ = z when z < 0. When z ¸ 0, (4)
holds from the non-negativity of ¼c. When z < 0,
P¿
t=0¼c(t) ¢ z(t) =
P¿
t=0¼c(t) ¢ z¡(t) and
lim¿!1
P¿
t=0¼c(t) ¢ z¡(t) exists and has a ¯nite value or +1 due to z ¸ b for some b 2 l1.
Thus (4) holds and hence
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ z(t) is well-de¯ned for any z 2 Ci ¡ f!ig.




















Let y0 2 Y. Then we have y ¡ y0 =
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) ¡ y 2
P
i Fi(xi) ¡ Y from the feasibility
of the weak Pareto allocation (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y),
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) ¡ y = 0. By the same argument
as before, we can show that for any " > 0 there is ¿o such that ¿ > ¿o implies
¿ X
t=0




0(t) ¡ "¼c(0)¢ e(0). (6)
14By the feasibility of weakly Pareto optimal allocations, y =
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) 2 Ci ¡ f!ig
holds. Thus (4) implies that ¼c ¢ y =
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ y(t) is a ¯nite value or +1. By letting ¿ !
1 and then taking " ! 0, we obtain
1 X
t=0




¼c(t) ¢ y0(t) for all y0 2 Y . (7)
Next we claim
¼c ¢ y =
1 X
t=0
¼c(t)¢ y(t) = 0: (8)
Since 0 2 Y is assumed, (7) implies
1 P
t=0
¼c(t)¢ y(t) ¸ 0. Note that ¡y =
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) ¡ 2y 2
P











¼c(t)¢ (y(t)) · 0. Thus we get the other part of the inequality in (8) and hence
(8).
Now we claim
¼c 6= 0: (9)
Suppose contrary that ¼ = ¼f. From assumption (5), v 2
P
i
F i(xi) ¡ Y implies that for any
² > 0 there is ¿0 such that (v(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢) + "e(0) 2
P
i
Fi(xi) ¡ Y holds for
any ¿ > ¿0. Since ® > 0 in Rn, (v(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢) + "e(0) is in l1. Then we have
¼ ¢ [(v(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢) + "e(0)]
= ¼f ¢ [(v(0);¢¢ ¢;v(¿);¡®;¡®;¢ ¢¢) +"e(0)]
= ¼f ¢ (v(0);¢ ¢ ¢;v(¿);0;0;¢ ¢ ¢) + ¼f ¢ "e(0)+ ¼f ¢ (0;¢0¢ ¢;0;¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢)
= ¼f ¢ (¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢) ¸ 0 (10)
since ¼f has only zero values over c00. On the other hand, ¼ = ¼f ¸ 0 and ® > 0 imply
¼f ¢ (¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢) · 0. (11)
Thus, ¼f ¢ (¡®;¡®;¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢) = 0 and hence ¼ = ¼f = 0 holds from (10) and (11). This is,
however, a contradiction to ¼ 6= 0. Therefore we establish (9).
Theorem 3{1 is a form of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics with
net trades. This theorem holds whenever the net trading sets are convex, closed, bounded
15from below by b 2 l1, even if the endowments cannot be expressed with points in E: We
will revisit this point in section 5. We indeed obtain the usual second theorem which is
independent of the distribution of endowments for consumers.








¼c(t) ¢ xi(t) for all x0




¼c(t) ¢ y0(t) · 0 for all y0 2 Y .
Proof) From the same way as that in the proof of Theorem 3{1, we have the inequality
(3 - 1) with letting ¼c a supporting price in theorem 3{1 since a Pareto optimal allocation is







¼c(t) ¢ xi(t)¡ "¼c(0) ¢e(0):








¼c(t)¢ xi(t) has only ¯nite value or +1 as the same way as before. By letting


















0(t) · 0 for all y
0 2 Y
and ¼c ¸ 0, ¼c 6= 0.
Both theorem 3{1 and corollary 3{1 do not exclude the case where
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (xi(t) ¡
!i(t)) = +1 and
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ xi(t) = +1. If
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (xi(t) ¡ !i(t)) = +1, then such




¼c(t) ¢ xi(t) = +1, then such allocation cannot be a valuation equilibrium. It












!i(t)) holds for every Pareto optimal
allocation by assumption (4). Thus if there is some i with
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ xi(t) = +1, then
16the valuation of aggregate endowments equals to +1, and so it is possible to distribute
any amount of income among consumers. Thus it is impossible for this allocation to be a
valuation equilibrium.
4 The Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. As discussed in the
previous section we take price system in sn which is not the dual of the commodity space.
With this price system there is commodity bundle which does not have the value.
We de¯ne a competitive equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition: A pair of an allocation and a price system ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);p) 2 C1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢
£ CH £Y £ sn is a competitive equilibrium if ;
1. For each i; xi 2 Bi(p) = fx 2 Ci :
1 P
t=0
p(t)¢ (x(t) ¡ !i(t)) · 0g and
x0 2 Pi(xi) implies
1 P
t=0
p(t)¢ (x0(t) ¡ !i(t)) > 0.
2. y 2 Y , p ¢ y = 0, and limsup¿
¿ P
t=0




(xi ¡ !i) = y
The positive part of valuation is net expenditure and the negative part of it is net income
from trade. As usual net expenditure cannot exceed the net income in the budget set Bi.
De¯nition 1 means that the allocation in the budget set is not strictly preferred to the
equilibrium allocation for each consumer.
De¯nition 2 is a form of the pro¯t maximization condition with constant returns to scale
technology. It is not necessary for every production plan to be evaluated by the equilibrium
pricesystem. Thus de¯nition2 requires that no production planinthe technology setcan get
strictly positive pro¯t in the long run. De¯nition 3 expresses the feasibility of a competitive
equilibrium allocation.
The step of our proof is the following: we useNegishi approachto ¯nd a quasi-equilibrium
by exploiting theorem 3{1. After thatwe show thequasi-equilibrium is actually acompetitive
equilibrium 8by using monotonicity and adequacy assumption. In order to apply Negishi
approach we must show the utility possibility set is compact in the ¯rst place.




(xi ¡ !i) 2 Y; xi 2 Ci for all ig. We call F a feasible set. F is non-
empty, convex, and compact in the product
Q
H





Proof) From assumption (7) (adequacy assumption), there is xi 2 Ci and yi 2 Y such
that xi ¡ !i < yi. Let x0
i = xi + (yi ¡ xi + !i) = yi + !i. By the monotonicity assumption,
x0
i 2 Ci holds. Since
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) =
P
i
yi 2 Y, F is non-empty. Clearly F is convex by the
convexity of Ci and Y .
Let F = f(x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH) : xi 2 Ci for all i and
P
i
(xi ¡ !i) 2 Y g. We claim that F is a
closed subset of the topological product of
Q
H
E. Let fx® = (x®
1;¢ ¢ ¢;x®
H)g a converging net
in F with the limit e xi with respect to ¾(E;W) for each i. Since Ciis ¾(E;W)-closed, e xi 2
Ci for each i. Consider the topological sum of E,
P
H




represented as V =
P
i
Vi where Vi is an open set in E for each i: Since the sum of open sets












¡ f!ig) is bounded below by Hb. Then from assumption (6), (
P
i
(Ci ¡ f!ig)) \ Y has an
upper bound a 2 E. Then if (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH) 2 F, we can see that b · xi · a ¡
P
j6=i
xj · a ¡ (H
¡ 1)b for all i. It follows that F is a compact set due to F ½
Q
H
[b;a¡ (H ¡1)b]. Recall that




[b;a ¡ (H ¡ 1)b] is compact in the product topology
Q
H
¾(E;W). Therefore F is
compact since any closed set in a compact set is compact.
Let fz® = (z®
1;¢ ¢ ¢;z®
H)g in F which is converging net with the limit e z = (e z1;¢ ¢ ¢; e zH).
Then we can take (x®
1;¢ ¢ ¢;x®
H) such that x®




i ¡ !i) 2 Y (thus (x®
1;¢
¢ ¢;x®




H). Since F is compact there exist a converging
subnet of fx®(k)g such that x
®(k)
i ! e xi and ( e x1;¢ ¢ ¢; e xH) 2 F. Then (z
®(k)





1 ;¢ ¢ ¢;x
®(k)
H ) anda subnet fz
®(k)
i g converges to e zi since z®
i ! e zi and ¾(E;W) is Hausdor®
topology. Thus (e z1;¢ ¢ ¢; e zH) · (e x1;¢ ¢ ¢; e xH) holds: Also e zi 2 Ci from the ¾(E;W)-closedness
of Ci for each i. Thus F is closed. As the same way as before, F ½
Q
H
[b;a ¡ (H ¡ 1)b] holds,
and so F is compact.
18Next lemma shows that there is a utility representation for our preference. We need this
because we use Negishi approach to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 4{2 : De¯ne Gi = ¼i(F) : the projection of F into Ci: Then for all i there exists
a ¾(E;W)-continuous function ui : Gi ! R such that xi 2 Pi(zi) if and only if ui(xi)
> ui(zi).
Proof) From lemma 4{1, F is compact. Since ¼i is continuous, Gi is compact. Moreover,
the preference P i is continuous, transitive, irre°exive, and convex, and Ri(x) is the closure
of Pi(x) for all x 2 Ci. Thus, we can apply Proposition 1 in Boyd{McKenzie (1993).4 It
assures the existence of a desired continuous function ui.
De¯ne 4 = fs = (s1;¢ ¢ ¢;sH) 2 RH
+ : s1 + ¢ ¢ ¢+ sH = 1g and U = f(u1(x1);¢ ¢ ¢;uH(xH))
: (x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH) 2 Fg, and ½(s) = supf® > 0 : ®s 2 Ug.
Lemma 4{3 : ½(s) is well de¯ned for s 2 4 and ½ : 4 ! R is a continuous function.
Proof) Since Gi is compact and ui :Gi !R is ¾(E;W)-continuous, Weiersraus's theorem
implies that there exists ai;bi 2 Gi such that ui(ai) · ui(x) · ui(bi) for x 2 Gi: Thus without
loss of generality we can assume ui(ai) = 0 for each i: From the adequacy assumption there
exists xi 2 Ci andyi 2 Y such that xi ¡ !i < yi. Let x0
i = yi + !i. Thenx0
i 2 Gi and ui(x0
i)
> ui(xi) ¸ 0 hold for each i. Thus f(z1;¢ ¢ ¢zH) : 0 · (z1;¢ ¢ ¢;zH) · (u1(x0
1);¢ ¢ ¢;uH(x0
H))g
½ U and hence ½(s) is well de¯ned.
We claim that ½(s) is continuous. Let ® > 0 satisfying ®s 2 U and let 0 < ¯ < ®. Pick
(x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH) 2 F such that ®s = (u1(x1);¢ ¢ ¢;uH(xH)). Then by continuity of the function
ui there exists some 0 < ± < 1 such that (u1(±x1);¢ ¢ ¢;uH(±xH)) > ¯s. let sn ! s, then
we know that (u1(±x1);¢ ¢ ¢;uH(±xH)) > ¯sn holds for su±ciently large n. Note that 0 ·




H) 2 U implies that (z1;¢ ¢ ¢;zH) 2 U from the
construction. Therefore ¯sn 2 U and so ¯ · ½(sn) holds for su±ciently large n. Thus ¯ ·
liminfn!1½(sn) holds for all 0 < ¯ < ®. Consequently ® · liminfn!1½(sn) for all ® >
0 with ®s 2 U. Therefore ½(s) · liminfn!1½(sn) holds.
4Although they use the product topology on s, the argument same as theirs still applies to our setting
with ¾(E;W) as well. The crucial fact in their argument is the connectedness of unit interval [0;1].
19Next let ½(s) < ¯. Fix r with½(s) < r < ¯. Since sn ! s andrs < ¯s, rs < ¯sn holds for
su±ciently large n. Suppose ¯sn 2 U, then rs 2 U. This, however, contradicts to ½(s) < r.
Therefore ¯sn = 2 U holds for su±ciently large n. It follows that limsupn!1½(sn) · ¯ for all
¯ with ½(s) < ¯ since ½(sn) · ¯ holds for su±ciently large n. Therefore limsupn!1½(sn)
· ½(s) holds. Together with the previous results we have lim½(sn) = ½(s) and so ½(s) is
continuous.
De¯ne a quasi-equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition: The pair of an allocation and price system ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);p) 2 C1 £ ¢ ¢ ¢£
CH £Y £ sn is a quasi equilibrium if :
1. For each i,
1 P
t=0
p(t)¢ (x(t) ¡ !i(t)) · 0 and x 2 Ri(xi) implies
1 P
t=0
p(t) ¢ (x(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸ 0.
2. y 2 Y ,
1 P
t=0
p(t) ¢ y0(t) = 0, and y0 2 Y implies limsup¿
1 P
t=0




(xi ¡ !i) = y:




Proof) For each s 2 4 there exists an allocation (xs
1;¢ ¢ ¢;xs







i ¡!i) = ys. Note that any allocation which satis¯es the above
equalities is weakly Pareto optimal.
From lemma 3{2, we can well de¯ne the following set :






i)¡ Y )\l1; ¼ 6= 0; ¼ ¸ 0g:
P(s) is nonempty and convex. Now for each s 2 4 we de¯ne the set :
©(s) = f(z1(s);¢ ¢ ¢;zH(s)) 2 R







i(t)) for all i,
where ¼c satis¯es ¼ = ¼c + ¼f for some ¼ 2 P(s):g
Since P(s) is nonempty from lemma 3{2 and it is convex, ©(s) is nonempty and convex.
We claim that ©(s) is uniformly bounded in RH independent of s and © has a closed graph.
20First we show that ©(s) is uniformly bounded. Since P(s) ½ P = f¼ 2 ba+ : k¼kba · 1g.
By Alaoglu's theorem (Dunford and Schwartz(1958) p. 424), P is ¾(ba;l1)-compact. By
the ¾(ba;l1)-continuity of ¼¢f for f 2 l1, we can apply Weierstraus' theorem and conclude
that there exists ¼ 2 P such that ¼ ¢ b · ¼ ¢ b for all ¼ 2 P. Remember b 2 l1 is a lower
bound of the net trading sets and b · xs




i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸
1 P
t=0




































¯. Then z(s) 2 ©(s) implies jzi(s)j · ± for each i and s 2
4. Thus ©(s) is uniformly bounded independent of s in RH.
Next we de¯ne a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of RH :
T = ft = (t1;¢ ¢ ¢;tH) 2 R




From the uniform boundedness of ©(s), ©(s) ½ T holds for every s 2 4. Recall that U(F)
is compact by the compactness of F and the continuity of ui for all i. Thus U(F) ½ RH has
upper bound ® = (®1;¢ ¢ ¢;®H) 2 RH
+. Fix some ´ > H2±A where A =
P
i




i) and de¯ne the function f : 4 £ T ! 4 by
f(s;t) = ([s1 +´¡1t1r(s)]+=
X
i
















(si + ´¡1tir(s)) = 1 + ´¡1 P
i




i) = r(s) · A. Then ¡H±A · tir(s) · H±A holds for any s 2 4. Therefore
1 +´¡1 X
i
tir(s) ¸ 1¡ ´¡1A±H2 > 0
holds. Consequently f is well de¯ned and continuous over 4 £ T.
Finally we de¯ne the nonempty correspondence ª : 4 £ T ! 24£Tnf;g by
ª(s;t) = ff(s;t)g £©(s):
21ª is convex valued. The fact © has a closed graph together with the continuity of f implies
that ª has also closed graph. Thus we can apply Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem and the
correspondence ª has a ¯xed point (s;t) 2 4 £ T such that s = f (s;t) and t 2 ©(s).
Pick some ¼ 2 P(s) such that ti =
1 P
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (!i(t) ¡ xs
i(t)). We claim ti = 0 for each
i. Suppose si = 0. Then [si + ´¡1tir(s)]+ = [´¡1tir(s)]+ = 0. Since ´¡1 > 0 and r(s) ¸






















Thus there must exists some j with tj > 0, and [sj + ´¡1tjr(s)]+ = sj + ´¡1tjr(s) = sj













i) = 0, then ui(xs
i) = 0 holds for
each i. Also by the adequacy assumption there exist xi 2 Ci, yi 2 Y such that xi ¡ !i < yi
for each i. Let x0






i ¡ !i ¡yi) = 0 hold. This, however. contradicts to the weakly Pareto optimality of
(xs
1;¢ ¢ ¢;xs
H;ys). Thus r(s) 6= 0 holds and it implies si > 0 for all i.
Therefore [si + ´¡1tir(s)]+ > 0 holds and this implies si + ´¡1tir(s) = si, or tir(s) = 0
for all i. Since r(s) 6= 0 holds for all i, thus ti =
1 P
t=0
¼c(t)¢ (!i(t) ¡ xs
i(t)) = 0 must hold for




i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸
1 P
t=0







i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸ 0 holds for all x0
i 2 Ri(xs
i).
The pro¯t maximization condition and the feasibility condition are already established in
theorem 3{1. Therefore we obtain a quasi-equilibrium (xs
i;¢ ¢;xs
H;ys;¼c).
Theorem 4{1: There exists a competitive equilibrium ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);p) with a price
system p(¸ 0) 2 l1; p 6= 0:
Proof) From lemma 4{4 we have a quasi-equilibrium ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);¼c). We claim this
is actually a competitive equilibrium. Since the feasibility (condition 3. in the de¯nition of a
22competitive-equilibrium) and pro¯t maximization condition (condition 2. in the de¯nition)
are already met, we only have to show condition 1. holds at quasi-equilibrium.
By assumption (7)(the aggregate adequacy assumption), there exists xi 2 Ci and yi 2
Y such that xi ¡ !i < yi and
P
i(yi ¡ (xi ¡ !i)) = (°;°;¢ ¢ ¢) for some °(2 Rn) > 0. Then
we have xi 2 F,
1 X
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (xi(t)¡ !i(t)) · limsup
1 X
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ yi(t) · 0




















Thus there exists at least for some j satisfying
1 X
t=0
¼c(t) ¢ (xj(t)¡ !j(t)) < 0. (12)
Then from lemma 4{4 we know xj = 2 Rj(xj) for j 2 I1. For x0
j 2 Pj(xj), de¯ne zµ = µx0
j




i(t) ¡ !i(t)) ¸ 0
holds. Now since Pj is ¾(E;W)-open valued in Cj from assumption (2) and x0
j is in P j(xj),
there exists µj 2 (0;1) such that zµj 2 Pj(xj). Moreover,
1 X
t=0






















j(t) ¡ !j(t)) = 0 holds, then we have
1 P
t=0
¼c(t)¢(zµj(t) ¡ !j(t)) < 0. This implies





!j(t)) 6= 0 and hence we have for every j 2 I1 that
x0




j(t) ¡!j(t)) > 0. (13)
23Condition 3. of competitive equilibrium holds for the consumers in I1.
Denote I1 for the set of consumers satisfying ¼c ¢ (x0
i ¡ !i) < 0 for some x0
i 2 Ci. From
(12) we know I1 6= ;. Let I2 be its complementary set in I. From the de¯nition, for any
i 2 I2,
x0
i 2 Ci implies ¼c ¢ (x0
i ¡ !i) ¸ 0. (14)
By using the argument similar to the one yielding (13) from (12), we can show that (13)
holds for the consumers in I1. Thus, it is enough to show I = I1 to prove that ((x1;¢ ¢
¢;xH;y);¼c) is a competitive equilibrium.
Suppose I2 is non-empty. From the irreducibility assumption, we know that there are ®i





i2I2 ®i(xi ¡!i) 2 Y. Since ¼c ¢ (xi ¡ !i) ¸ 0 holds for any i 2 I, we have
¼c ¢y








i ¡ !i) · 0 (15)
from the pro¯t maximization condition in lemma 4{4. Since (13) holds for any j 2 I1,
¼c ¢ (xj ¡ !j) > 0, and hence
X
j2I1
¼c ¢ (xj ¡ !j) > 0 (16)
holds.
Now consider i 2 I2. Then, the fact that xi 2 Ci ¡ f!ig for some ¾i > 0 yields
¼c ¢ ®i(x





i ¡ !i) ¸ 0 (17)
holds. (16) and (17) are, however, a contradiction to (15). Thus, this contradiction implies
I2 = ; or I1 = I. Therefore condition 3. of competitive equilibrium holds for each consumer
i at ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);¼c), and ((x1;¢ ¢ ¢;xH;y);¼c) is a desired competitive equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
It has been shown that the regularity assumption is su±cient condition for the second fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics with general consumption sets in economies over an
24discrete time in¯nite horizon. There is a combination of the separate conditions on pref-
erences, consumption sets and the production set which implies the regularity assumption.
If preferences are ¾(E;W)- continuous, consumption sets contain the lower bounds in l1
and the aggregate adequacy assumption is satis¯ed then the exclusion assumption on the
production set implies the regularity assumption. In other words if consumers are myopic
enough to supply some constant positive net supply in the far future and a production can
be stopped at some period then the regularity assumption is satis¯ed. In order to obtain
an equilibrium with price system in l1, Bewley(1972) assumed the exclusion assumption ,
consumption set is positive orthant of l1; and !i is in the interior of positive orthant of l1:
Our theorem assures that equilibrium price system is actually in l1 with general consumption
set without interiority assumption for endowment whenE = l1 and W = l1: Thus our result
is a generalization of Bewley's result in the case of l1.
Assumption 7 in Boyd{McKenzie(1993) implies that both of the regularity assumption
and the aggregate adequacy assumption holds. They use their assumption 7 in order to
translate Edgeworth equilibrium into a competitive equilibrium. Our separation argument
shows that we can substitute the regularity assumption of Boyd{McKenzie(1993) with our
regularity assumption for the same purpose. This is possible by virtue of our new price
normalization instead of theirs. Thus in the setting of this paper Edgeworth equilibrium can
be translated into a competitive equilibrium based on our regularity assumption. It implies
the equivalence of a competitive equilibrium allocation and Edgeworth euilibrium allocation
under our regularity assumption and irreducibility. The equivalence holds with stronger
regularity assumption and the strong irreducibility assumptiom in Boyd{McKenzie(1993) .
Our results might be extended to economies with general convex production set drawing
on the regularity assumption and the same approach used here.
Comparing the uniform properness assumption with the regularity assumption would be
interesting. Both assumptions are closely relevant to the marginal rate of substitutions of
preferences and production.
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